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As the curtain falls on the Obama presidency, historians have already begun
to put the past Administration into a broader context.
While only the Affordable Care Act will be identified by the former President’s name—even Obama has
embraced the Obamacare moniker—the Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, or
Dodd-Frank, will figure prominently in any assessment of Obama’s legacy.
As with its older sibling, how Dodd-Frank is
assessed will be a partial function of how much of
it survives. Since before its enactment in July 2010,
Republicans have been circling wagons to amend it,
gut it, or repeal it. Now that the party has assumed
control of both houses of Congress and the White
House, some skeptics are ready to forecast the dismantling of Dodd-Frank. For support, they point to the
Financial CHOICE Act, a piece of legislation introduced by Republicans in September 2016.1
Not so fast. While the CHOICE Act would
certainly amount to a wholesale repudiation and near
complete repeal of Dodd-Frank’s key provisions, a difficult political dynamic is underway that the election
of Donald Trump complicates, rather than facilitates.
At play is both an ideological difference in how the
government should approach financial reform, but also
institutional differences that have more to do with
presidential politics than partisan ideology.

SUMMARY
• When it comes to financial regulation, many have assumed
that the Trump Administration will now work in concert with a
Republican-controlled Congress to repeal Dodd-Frank in full—
a move anticipated in the CHOICE Act, a piece of legislation
introduced by Republicans in September 2016. But there are
reasons to believe that this will not be so straightforward.
• Republicans fashioned the CHOICE Act in anticipation of a
Hillary Clinton presidency, with the goal of limiting the executive’s discretion in response to financial risk. In light of Donald
Trump’s unexpected rise to the Presidency, it is possible that
some Republicans may start reevaluating the benefits of limiting
executive authority. And recent comments by President Trump’s
pick for Treasury Secretary, Steven Mnuchin, suggest that the
Administration favors keeping some aspects of Dodd-Frank.
• This issue brief examines the tension between the Republican
ideological commitment to curbing executive power and the
opportunity Republicans now have for Trump to dominate the
direction of financial regulatory reform. The discussion will
focus on three key policy outcomes that Republicans have
sought during the last six years: reforming the Federal Reserve, overhauling the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
and changing the way in which the nation’s largest financial
institutions are designated and regulated.
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In this Issue Brief, I will discuss
those two sometimes conflicting motivations behind Republican reform
of the financial sector and focus
especially on three key policy outcomes that Republicans have sought
during the last six years: reforming
the Federal Reserve, overhauling
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and changing the way
the largest financial institutions are
regulated. The issues described here
are much broader than the CHOICE
Act, though that proposed legislation
provides a useful jumping off point
for discussion. The real questions are
about who controls power within the
party system: those with ideological
commitments to specific policy outcomes, or those who seek to increase
the institutional power of the President. Prior to last November, Republican calls for financial reform had been
predicated on a Hillary Clinton presidency. Now that that has not come to
pass, and Republicans control both
the executive and legislative branches,
this Issue Brief reviews a new set of
questions that have arisen as to how
the ruling party will pursue its agenda
with respect to financial regulation.

THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS
OF FINANCIAL REFORM

The CHOICE Act reflects those
twin pillars. The surprise election of
Donald Trump suggests to many,
including the CHOICE Act’s sponsors in Congress, that this Republican
approach to governance and regulation will finally get its due. But there
is a problem with this assumption. The
CHOICE Act is a staging ground not
only for ideological conflict between
technocratic Democrats and marketoriented Republicans, but also for
an institutional conflict between the
executive and Congress. The bill was
introduced with the presumption that
Hillary Clinton would win the presidential election. Much of the language
aimed at limiting the powers of the
executive can be read through that
prism. But what does the direction of
financial reform under an ostensibly
unified Republican federal government look like? And what happens if
the new Republican President disapproves of some of his party’s established views on the 2010 law?
These are the questions for those
who would predict a wholesale abandonment of Dodd-Frank. While we
cannot be sure of the final shape of
a financial reform under a government united by the Republican Party,
we can be certain that the policy
and institutional preferences of the

It is inaccurate to refer to “DoddFrank” as a single law. It is, in fact,
sixteen different statutes rolled into
one. But when Dodd-Frank’s critics point to an overarching zeitgeist,
it is essentially technocratic: the Act
puts enormous power in the hands of
regulators—whether at the Federal
Reserve or FDIC, or new agencies like
the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and the Financial Stability
Oversight Council—to prevent, manage, and resolve abuses of the financial
system that can result in crisis.
The Republican model for reform
is very different. Rather than delegating to regulators this power,
the Republican model would place
more control in the hands of market
participants themselves and, failing
that, judges. The defenders of the
Republican plan for financial reform
would emphasize a light governmental
touch and the rule of law. Let market
participants allocate risk as makes
most sense to their business model
and let them fail when they cannot.
That failure will be resolved by lawfollowing bankruptcy judges after the
fact, not fine-tuning central bankers
well before.

NOTES
For a summary of the CHOICE Act’s key features, see
http://nascus.org/publications/NASCUSReport/2016/
CHOICE%20summary.pdf.
2 Jesse Hamilton, “Mnuchin Puts Pressure on Banks Over
Volcker Rule, Glass-Steagall,” Bloomberg, January 19,
2017.
3 Peter Conti-Brown, The Power and Independence of the
Federal Reserve, Princeton University Press, 2016; Rand
Paul and Mark Spitznagel, “The Fed is Crippling America,”
TIME, January 10, 2016 ; Binyamin Appelbaum and Brady
Dennis, “Legislation by Senator Dodd would overhaul
1

banking regulators,” Washington Post , November 11,
2009.
4 Victoria McGrane, “Elizabeth Warren and David Vitter
Introduce Fed Legislation,” Wall Street Journal , May
7, 2015. Warren (D-MA) and Vitter (R-LA) have jointly
criticized the Fed’s lack of transparency and introduced
a bill to distribute authority and responsibility more evenly
among Fed governors.
5 For example, see Janet Yellen’s November 16, 2015 letter
to House Speaker Paul Ryan and Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/
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files/ryan-pelosi-letter-20151116.pdf.
See the transcript of the Meeting of the Federal Open
Market Committee, November 1-2, 2011 available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
FOMC20111102meeting.pdf.
7 From the opening lines of a speech delivered by Ben
Bernanke on November 14, 2007: “Montagu Norman, the
Governor of the Bank of England from 1921 to 1944, reputedly took as his personal motto, “Never explain, never
excuse.” Norman’s aphorism exemplified how he and
many of his contemporaries viewed the making of mon6
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Republican President will change that
ethos. For example, President Trump’s
nominee for Treasury Secretary, Steve
Mnuchin, has already walked back the
idea of doing away with Dodd-Frank
in its entirety. During his Senate
confirmation hearing, Mnuchin said
that the new administration favors the
Volcker Rule, which prevents commercial banks from using depository
assets for making investments not on
behalf of a client. As Mnuchin stated,
“The concept of proprietary trading
does not belong in banks with FDIC
insurance.”2 This declaration should
surprise some of Obama’s and DoddFrank’s longest-standing Republican
critics: repeal of the Volcker Rule has
long been a goal of those critics.
Whatever the ultimate direction that these legislative and executive debates take, three major points
will be central to any discussion of
financial reform. These three areas
of potential reform are: the Federal
Reserve’s operations, particularly as
they pertain to how the Fed conducts monetary policy; the role of
the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau; and the process of designating
and regulating large financial institutions as “systemically important” and
thus subject to additional regulatory
constraints. The remainder of this

Issue Brief highlights and addresses
the critical aspects of each of these
three areas, with the acknowledgment
that other important issues remain
outstanding, such as the complexities
of the Volcker Rule and the massive
growth of the shadow banking system.

REMODELING THE ROLE OF
THE FED
Politicians, activists, academics, and
central banks have discussed many
ways to alter the status quo of the
Fed’s independent monetary policy
authority and financial industry
supervision over the past few years.3
In response to the Fed’s outsized role
in combatting the ill effects of the
financial crisis, there has been a call
for greater transparency and accountability of the Bank’s activities. While
the Fed has been subject to a variety
of critiques for the way it has handled
the response to financial crises and
bank supervision generally, the main
focus—and certainly the place where
the Fed is likely to fight back the
hardest4—is in the specific ways that
it conducts monetary policy.
Republicans have long criticized
the Fed for using discretion in conducting monetary policy, rather than
following a rigid, programmatic rule.

NOTES
etary policy--as an arcane and esoteric art, best practiced
out of public view.” Available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20071114a.htm.
8 J. Lawrence Broz, “The Federal Reserve’s Coalition in
Congress,” Working Paper, February 2015.
9 See the Federal Reserve System Audited Annual Financial
Statements available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/bst_fedfinancials.htm#audited.
10 The CHOICE Act goes further by mandating a retrospective
review of all regulations every five years against a predetermined set of metrics for the purpose of determining

regulatory efficacy. This requirement would apply across
the board to every financial regulatory agency.
11 The current proposal does not abolish the FSOC outright,
but rather repurposes the entity as an inter-agency forum
on financial stability with a mission that is largely relegated to market monitoring and information sharing. In that
sense, it mirrors the pre-Dodd-Frank Presidential Working
Group on Financial Markets, created by Ronald Reagan in
1988.

3

Legislative proposals, including within
the CHOICE Act but also predating
it, would insert much more congressional engagement with monetary
policy through more transparent
rulemaking. House Republicans have
called for the Fed’s monetary policy
committee, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), to explain all
of their policy rate decisions in terms
of a standardized rule and to do so,
specifically to Congress, within days
of each FOMC meeting. Critics of
this proposal have wrongly asserted
that this rule necessarily must be the
Taylor Rule, named for the simple
arithmetic function first devised by
Stanford economist John Taylor to
describe how the Fed conducted
monetary policy from 1987-1992. The
original proposals do indeed mandate
that conformity, but the current legislative plan would require the Fed to
choose its own rule and explain why
it deviates from the Taylor Rule, if in
fact it does.
The Fed has argued—persuasively,
in my view—against this proposal.5
Guiding monetary policymaking
by a coherent and consistent rule is
not necessarily disadvantageous. The
Fed has embraced this method for
decision-making, as the recent disclosures in the 2011 FOMC transcripts
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suggest.6 And the idea that the Fed
should not be a fortress of technical solitude is a sound one. We are a
long way off from the central banking
ethos that dominated the 19th and
20th centuries to “never explain, never
excuse,” in the words of one prominent central banker.7
Indeed, the Fed is today one of the
most transparent of all governmental
institutions. It holds regular press conferences; its key leaders give speeches
and congressional testimony. Its minutes are released after three weeks, and
full transcripts released on a five-year
lag. Mandating monetary policymaking by rule will enhance transparency
in some ways, but it won’t add transparency where none exists.
Perhaps more importantly, transparency isn’t always an unmitigated
good. When macroeconomic conditions change, the Fed presently has
the flexibility to adjust course, regardless of any guiding rule, without
worrying about triggering searing
congressional scrutiny at precisely the
time of monetary experimentation.
A fixed rule, especially one reportable to and subject to the oversight by
Congress, could prevent the Fed from
being able to quickly pivot in response
to new information. The alternative is
monetary policymaking by legislative
committee, which is an institutional
arrangement that independent central
banks are precisely designed to correct.
A second perennial proposal is
a U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) annual audit of the
Fed’s day-to-day monetary policy
operations. Auditing the Fed enjoys
a storied, bipartisan history, but it is
important to distinguish an accounting audit from a political one.8 Today,

the Federal Reserve undergoes a thorough accounting audit each year, conducted by a leading accounting firm
with topline results disclosed to the
public.9 It is also audited by the GAO
in other ways, and has an independent
Inspector General that conducts audits
and investigations of various activities.
Congress has also mandated one-time
audits of specific activities, as it did
in Dodd-Frank in auditing the Fed’s
emergency lending program.
That leaves the question: what
is left for the GAO to audit? The
answer is the Fed’s internal monetary
policy deliberations, especially where
those decisions are controversial. It is
again understandable that members
of Congress want to have a tighter
grip on the way the Fed conducts
itself: the Fed is, after all, a creature
of Congress. But a GAO audit would
only increase the level of organizational complexity within the Fed,
already one of the most complex
institutions of government. It would
also be an easy bludgeon for members
of Congress to litigate their preferred
approach to monetary politics. Again,
insulating the Fed from the day-today of partisan politics is precisely the
point of independent central banking. That insulation isn’t a complete
removal—the Fed is still deeply
embedded within the political system.
But a GAO audit of monetary policy
would remove almost all of that insulation altogether.
A third, newer proposal, subjects
all financial regulatory agencies to
the annual appropriations process.
The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s non-appropriated status has
long been a source of contention,
as discussed below, but the Federal
4

Reserve has funded itself beyond
appropriations since its founding in
1913. The current proposal would
exclude the Fed’s monetary policy
operations and focus solely on its
regulatory and financial supervisory
activities. In principle, there is justification for this proposal, given how
important the appropriations process
is to congressional oversight of the
administrative state and how much
financial regulators have existed outside of that process (in addition to the
CFPB and the Fed, the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and some
other financial regulators are also not
subject to the appropriations process).
The proposal’s defining weakness, though, is that appropriations
oversight is a blunt tool not easily
separated among functions. If it is true
that the Fed should have budgetary
independence for the conduct of monetary policy, then subjecting it to the
appropriations process for regulatory
matters will only invite congressional
meddling into anything the Fed does
that is of political interest to members
of Congress. In practice, there may be
no meaningful way to separate supervisory and regulatory activity from
monetary policymaking.

OVERHAULING THE CFPB
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau began its life as a policy
proposal by then-Professor Elizabeth
Warren, published in Democracy
magazine in 2007. Interestingly, the
“Financial Product Safety Commission” that Warren first proposed
(or the Consumer Financial Protection Agency originally proposed in
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the Frank version of the statute that
became Dodd-Frank) looks very little
like the final Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau created by the final
statute. The differences are at the heart
of what makes the CFPB so controversial today. These differences have
little to do with functions and everything to do with structure. Functionally, the CFPB today is very much in
line with what Warren, now a Democratic Senator from Massachusetts,
proposed —the CFPB seeks to protect
consumers from financial fraud and
educate them about financial products
like mortgages, credit cards, and student loans. But structurally, the decision to render the new governmental
agency a sub-bureau of the Federal
Reserve headed by a single individual
was not a Democratic idea, but a
Republican one. Senator Bob Corker
(R-TN) was a key figure in negotiating the Senate version of the bill and
changing the structural features of the
CFPB not to insulate it from political oversight, but to quiet conservative
fears about more and more bureaucracy interfering with market activity.
The model for the CFPB was the Fed,
not the SEC.
Republican enthusiasm for that
different structure didn’t even last
through the legislative session that
created it. The latest proposals would
effectively abolish the CFPB and
replace it with a regulatory commission called the “Consumer Financial
Opportunity Commission,” given the
dual mandate to enforce consumer
financial protection laws (though
with significantly limited tools for
doing so) while enhancing “financial opportunity” for individuals and
businesses, including banks. It would

also be subject to the congressional
appropriations process (it is currently
funded through the Fed), be required
to conduct cost-benefit analyses for
all its regulations, and lose much of its
enforcement authority. For example,
it would have to consider the safety
and soundness of financial institutions
when promulgating new rules.10 States
and tribes would be allowed to request
unconditional waivers from CFPB
regulations governing short-term,
small-dollar credit (i.e., payday loans).
And the Commission also would no
longer have the authority to ban products or services it deems abusive.
The curious redesign of the CFPB
prompts the question: why not just
abolish the agency altogether? The
answer probably has more to do with
the optics of that kind of abolition
rather than policy preference. Given
that House Republicans fear the backlash for being seen on the wrong side
of consumers, abolishing the Bureau
is not politically feasible, leaving an
overhaul of its organizational structure and elimination of much of its
functional authority as the only way to
accomplish those same ends.
The debate the Republicans seek
to have is a worthy one. Should the
CFPB look more like the SEC, less
like the Fed? Should the United States
have a CFPB at all? Certainly its budgetary autonomy protects it from congressional oversight in a way that most
agencies don’t enjoy. (See Figure 1 for
how the CFPB’s budget per employee
compares to the Fed and SEC.) But
that debate should be clear on its
terms. Restructuring the CFPB as an
ambiguously charged independent
commission would produce precisely
the kind of bureaucratic muddle that
5

Senate Republicans sought to avoid
by making the CFPB an independent
bureau of the Fed in the first place.
If the Republicans want to eliminate the Bureau on the charge that it
has overstepped its bounds and that
consumer financial protection regulations hurt consumers more than they
protect them, then that merits debate.
Deregulation through reregulation
is an inefficient, opaque, and confusing mechanism for accomplishing the
same goal.
Journalists have tried, in vain, to
get a commitment from the Trump
Administration on the CFPB’s future.
Of all the various aspects of financial
reform, the identity and future of the
CFPB will probably be the most contested fight of the upcoming debate.

RETHINKING SIFI
DESIGNATION AND
REGULATION
The third debate, already underway
and likely to continue, relates to the
way the federal government regulates
the nation’s largest banks. The DoddFrank Act created the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
to designate bank and non-bank
financial companies as SIFIs and thus
subject to greater regulatory burdens
meant to prevent their failure. This is
the first order of business for DoddFrank, appropriately located in the
Act’s Title I. The CHOICE Act, and
likely any future incarnation, would
repeal most of this authority.11
Under the proposed legislation, the
FSOC’s authority to break up large
financial institutions upon the recommendation of the Federal Reserve
would disappear. The Council’s
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FIGURE 1 ANNUAL BUDGET PER EMPLOYEE (IN THOUSANDS) FOR SELECTED
FINANCIAL REGULATORS, 2011-2015
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research support arm – the Office of
Financial Research – would be eliminated. Additionally, the FSOC would
no longer be able to designate nonbanks as SIFIs, and all of its previous
designations of non-bank financial
companies (e.g., AIG, Prudential, and
MetLife) would be invalidated. This
includes clearinghouses for derivatives
– one of the very few aspects that both
Republicans and Democrats lauded
in the 2010 law. And even those large
banks that Republicans agree could
threaten the stability of the financial
system could make a few changes
to their capital structures and avoid
most of the regulatory framework that
Dodd-Frank created.
If Republicans have shown
discomfort with Title I, they have
wholesale disregard for Title II. Title
II recognizes that the regulatory
efforts to prevent the largest banks
from failure will not always work and
provides a second, regulator-focused
process whereby the largest banks are
resolved through an “orderly liquidation” rather than either a messy bailout
or a catastrophic bankruptcy. Reflect-

SEC
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FED

ing a strong Republican consensus, the
CHOICE Act eliminates all of Title
II and replaces it with an addition to
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. When critics have said they hope to repeal the
Dodd-Frank Act, they are sometimes
speaking of precisely this proposal.
Some of the ablest experts on
Dodd-Frank view Title II as creating
an institutional framework that will
effectively guarantee further 2008style government interventions in
market processes. But it is not at all
obvious that so-called Article I judges
are a superior approach. Bankruptcy
judges are not experts in banking, and
may be too inclined to treat bank debt
as they would any other corporate
reorganization. There may be benefits
to letting Dodd-Frank test its mettle
before handing over all liquidation
authority to courts.

CONCLUSION
The Republican vision of financial
regulatory relief over the last six years
has been focused on limiting the
executive’s discretion in response to
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financial risk. Purists will continue
to lobby for these limits regardless
of who holds the office of President,
viewing ample executive discretion
as the core problem to be corrected.
Political strategists, however, who
awoke in a Republican-controlled
Washington, DC, may start reevaluating their priorities. Now that a
Republican is President, the great
unknown for the future of financial reform is whether an insulated
CFPB with a Trump appointee at its
helm is the surest way to effectuate
Republican policy goals, or whether a
Trump-dominated Fed is superior to
a rule-bound central bank more likely
to interfere with Republican fiscal
priorities, or a regulatory apparatus
dominated by sympathetic personnel is
indeed preferable to a system with less
of that kind of partisan control. And,
of course, much of the outcome on
these policies will be driven by Trump
himself. The White House is divided
between those, like the Secretary of
the Treasury-designate, who are old
hands on Wall Street and those who
reflect more of a populist suspicion
of that very authority. It is on three
key issues – the Fed’s role as a central
bank and financial regulator insulated
from Congressional oversight and the
appropriations process; the CFPB’s
governance structure and broad
authority; and the designation and
regulation of SIFIs – that the most
important piece of financial legislation in decades, the Dodd-Frank Act,
will be affirmed, amended, or rejected.
Each path has enormous ramifications
for the health and stability of the U.S.
financial system.
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